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Pris: 1685 SEK exkl. moms  |  Every October the Fordham Competition Law Institute brings together leading figures from governmental organizations, leading international law firms and corporations and academia to examine and analyze the most important issues in international antitrust and trade policy of the United States, the EU and the world. This work is the most definitive and comprehensive annual analysis of international antitrust law and policy available anywhere.
Each annual edition sets out to explore and analyze the areas of antitrust/competition law that have had the most impact in that year. Recent "hot topics" include antitrust enforcement in Asia, Latin America: competition enforcement in the areas of telecommunications, media and information technology.
All of the chapters raise questions of policy or discuss new developments and assess their significance and impact on antitrust and trade policy.
The chapters are revised and updated before publication when necessary. As a result, the reader receives up-to-date practical tips and important analyses of difficult policy issues. The annual volumes are an indispensable guide through the sea of international antitrust law. The Fordham Competition Law Proceedings are acknowledged as simply the most definitive US/EC annual analyses of antitrust/competition law published.
Contents:
Foreword
Summary Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Chapter 1
OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET POWER – AN ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE
by Ronit Kan and Ilan Steiner
I. Introduction
II. The Market Power Triangle
III. Revision of Concentration Group Provisions in Israel’s Restrictive Trade Practices Act (RTPA)
A. Oligopolies in the Context of a Small Island Economy
B. Overview of the Proposed Revision
C. Comments on the Proposed Revision
IV. Conclusion
Chapter 2
STRIVING FOR THE OPTIMAL BALANCE IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT, ANTITRUST REMEDIES AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
by Christine A. Varney
I. Introduction: The Legacy of The International Competition Policy Advisory Committee
II. In Search of Greater Convergence in Global Antitrust Enforcement Standards
A. Single-Firm Conduct
B. Antitrust Remedies – Fines
III. Conclusion: Towards Greater Transparency and Procedural Fairness
Chapter 3
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS
A. Paul Victor, Moderator
Bernhard Heitzer
Ronit Kan
Jon Leibowitz
Philip Lowe
Graeme Samuel
Philip J. Weiser
Panel Discussion
Chapter 4
ANTITRUST AND STATE AID CONTROL – THE LESSONS LEARNED
by Neelie Kroes
I. Antitrust Progress
II. The Value of State Aid Control
III. How Does The System Work?
IV. The Car Industry
V. Is The System Working?
Chapter 5
STATE AIDS AND EU COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY — Q & A
by Neelie Kroes
Q&A
Chapter 6
EUROPEAN STATE AID POLICY IN SEARCH OF A STANDARD. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS?
by Alberto Heimler
I. Introduction
II. The EC Policy on State Aid, The Optimal Institutional - Setting and The New Economic Approach
A. State aid policy and the quality of regulation
B. Article 87, paragraph 1, and distortions of competition
C. The exemption of incompatible State aid
D. The new economic approach in State aid policy
III. Restructuring Aid and the Alitalia Case
IV. Locational Aid and the Charleroi Case
V. The Recovery of Unlawful State Aid and the Italian Digital Decoder Case
VI. Conclusion
Chapter 7
EU AND UK COMPETITION LAWS AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS. THE PRICE OF AVOIDING SYSTEMIC FAILURE
by Simon Polito
I. Introduction
II. EU State Aid Regime and The Financial Crisis
A. An Overview of the EU Regime
B. Pre-October 2008
C. Post October 2008
III. UK Merger Control and The Financial Crisis
A. An Overview of the UK Regime
B. Development of the Crisis in the UK Banking Sector
C. Regulatory Decisions Affecting The UK Banking Sector
D. Banking Sector Reform
IV. Conclusions and Reflections
A. Commission
B. UK Authorities
Chapter 8
GOVERNMENT AID, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND COMPETITION IN A DISTRESSED ECONOMY
by James F. Rill
I. Introduction
II. Direct Financial Aid and Competition
III. Indirect Aid Through Relaxing Antitrust
IV. The Call For Expanded Antitrust Initiatives
V. Conclusion
Chapter 9
EUROPEAN STATE AID LAW IN THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS — HAS THE COMMISSION RISEN TO THE CHALLENGE?
by Ulrich Soltész and Christian von Köckritz
I. Introduction
II. Overview of the General State Aid Framework
A. The Rationale for Effective State Aid Policy
B. The EC State Aid Law Regime
III. The Commission’s Response to The Financial Crisis
A. The Financial Crisis: A Serious Challenge to EC State Aid Law?
B. The Commission’s Response: Art. 87 (3) b) EC
C. After The Restructuring Communication — Has The Commission Found the Right Approach for Applying Art. 87 (3) (b) EC in the Financial Sector?
IV. A Side Note: State Aid Control and the “Real Economy” In Times of Crisis
A. The “Temporary Framework” — Background
B. Basic Principles
C. Instruments under the Temporary Framework
D. Procedural Issues
E. The Temporary Framework — the right response to the crisis in the real economy?
V. Conclusion
Chapter 10
GOVERNMENT AID AND COMPETITION CONDITIONS
by Bernard Spitz
I. The Situation of The French Insurance Industry Regarding State Aids
II. The Position of the Insurance Industry Vis-À-Vis State Aids Granted within the Current Financial Crisis
III. Unlike The Banks, The Insurance Industry Received Almost No State Aids in the Current Financial Crisis, Due to a Fundamental Difference in Nature
IV. The Threats of State Aids on Fair Competition in the Insurance Field
V. The Monitoring of State Aids by the EU Commission In Response to the Fears of the Non-Aided Companies
VI. Monitoring Restructuring Aids as Part of Economic Regulation
Chapter 11
STATE AIDS AND EU COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY
Frédéric Jenny, Presider
Seth Bloom
Alberto Heimler
Philip Lowe
Susan Bright
James F. Rill
Ulrich Soltesz
Bernard Spitz
Panel Discussion
Chapter 12
DOES GENERIC ENTRY ALWAYS INCREASE CONSUMER WELFARE?
by Henry Grabowski, Tracy Lewis, Rahul Guha, Zoya Ivanova, Maria Salgado and Sally Woodhouse
I. Introduction
II. Benefits and Costs of Branded and Generic Drugs
III. The Effects of Generic Entry on Competition and Consumer Welfare
A. The Nature of Competition In Pharmaceutical Markets
B. The Effect of Generic Entry on Brand Competition
C. The Effect of Generic Entry on Prices
D. The Effect of Generic Entry on Consumer Welfare
IV. Implications For The Analysis Of Generic Competition In Other Markets
A. Implications For The European Union (EU)
B. Implications For Biologics
V. Conclusion
Chapter 13
PARALLEL TRADE IN PHARMACEUTICALS: FIRM RESPONSES AND COMPETITION POLICY
by Margaret K. Kyle
I. Introduction
II. Legal Status of Parallel Trade
A. Parallel Trade in the European Union
B. Parallel Trade in the United States
C. Parallel Trade in Other Major Markets
III. Economic Models of Parallel Trade
IV. Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Parallel Trade
A. The EU Experience in Pharmaceuticals
B. Empirical Evidence in Other Contexts
V. Parallel Trade and Competition Policy
A. Competition Law in the European Union
B. Competition Law in the United States
IV. Conclusion
Chapter 14
PATENT SETTLEMENTS AND AUTHORIZED GENERICS — LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES
by Caroline B. Manogue
I. Patent Settlements
II. Authorized Generics
Chapter 15
PRICING IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN SPAIN: AN OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS UNDER COMPETITION LAW
by Edurne Navarro Varona and Luis Moscoso del Prado
I. Introduction
II. The Facts of the Case and the Commission Decision
III. The CFI Ruling
IV. The Advocate General’s Opinion
V. The Ruling of the European Court of Justice
VI. Some Comments on the Glaxo Saga
A. Definition of Restrictions By Object and Application to the Specific Case
B. The Distinction Between Restrictions By Object and By Effects
VII. The Spanish Cases
VIII. Conclusion
Chapter 16
THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN EU COMPETITION LAW, THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE ROLE OF INTENT
by Anne Nielsen
I. Parallel Trade and Pharmaceutical Products
II. The Early Cases Before The ECJ: Deciding Whether The Competition or Free Movement Rules Applied
III. Accession of New Member States
IV. Increased Scrutiny Under The Competition Rules
V. Allegations of Abuse of a Dominant Position
VI. Astrazeneca
VII. From Parallel Trade in the Article 81 and 82 EC Contexts to the AZ Case to the Sector Inquiry
VIII. The European Commission Sector Inquiry
IX. Concluding Remarks
Chapter 17
THE APPLICATION OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR -- SOME PERSONAL THOUGHTS
by Dr. Dominik Schnichels
I. Introduction
A. The Commission Inquiry into the Pharmaceutical Sector
B. Main Market Features and Trends
C. Past Enforcement Practice
D. Scope and Structure of the Article
II. Application of Competition Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector
A. Relationship of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and Competition Law
B. Market Definition
C. Patent Settlements
D. Parallel Trade
III. Conclusions
Chapter 18
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND COMPETITION LAW
Luc Gyselen, Presider
William E. Kovacic
Margaret K. Kyle
Tracy R. Lewis
Caroline B. Manogue
Anne N. Nielsen
Dominik Schnichels
Panel Discussion
Chapter 19
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: EXPLAINING THE CONTROVERSY,AND SMALL STEPS TOWARDS A MORE NUANCED POLICY
by Matthew Bennett, Amelia Fletcher, Emanuele Giovannetti and David Stallibrass
I. Introduction and Conclusions
II. Legal and Economic Background: The Root of Disagreement
A. Creating legal certainty around the law on agreements
B. Comparison with Article 82
C. Implications for RPM
III. Introduction to the Economics of RPM
A. Efficiency benefits of RPM
B. Anticompetitive effects of RPM
C. The dreaded question: How often is RPM likely to be on balance harmful?
IV. Small Steps Towards a More Nuanced Policy?
A. Ensuring that the presumption of illegality is truly rebuttable
B. The use of screens for prioritising RPM cases
C. The use of screens within a legal standard
V. Conclusions
Chapter 20
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE IN THE EU: in statu quo ante bellum?
by Eric Gippini-Fournier
I. Introduction
II. Resale Price Maintenance: The Pain And The Gain
A. Some Reasons Why RPM is a Cause for Concern
B. Procompetitive claims with regard to RPM
III. RPM In The EU: Plus Ça Change, Plus C’est La Même Chose?
A. The importance of the procedural setup
B. The nature of the rule against RPM in the Verticals BER
IV. Concluding Thoughts
Chapter 21
THE LEEGIN OPPORTUNITY: A REASONABLE MINIMUM RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
by Tommy Prud’homme
I. Background
A. Dr. Miles
B. Colgate
C. Beech Nut and Parke Davis
D. Sylvania
E. Monsanto
F. Business Electronics
G. Kahn
H. Leegin
II. Defining “Agreement”: Leegin Cut the Legs from under Colgate, Monsanto and Business Electronics
III. The Structured Rule of Reason
IV. Conclusion
Chapter 22
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND ARTICLE 81 EC: DEVELOPING A MORE SENSIBLE ANALYTICAL APPROACH
by Andreas P. Reindl
I. Introduction
II. The Economics-Based Framework for Article 81 Analysis
A. A Determination That an Agreement “Restricts Competition” Must Include an Explanation of How the Agreement Increases Market Power, Regardless of Whether the Analysis Focuses on a “Restriction by Object” or “Restriction by Effect” Analysis
B. Both the “Object” Analysis and the “Effect” Analysis in Article 81(1) Are Evidence Based, Although the Former Relies More on Empirical Evidence, Judicial Experience and Consistent Economic Theory on the Effects of a Specific Restraint to Support a General Rule That the Restraint “Restricts Competition,” the Latter on a Fuller Analysis of the Facts of a Specific Case
C. Although “Restriction by Object” and “Restriction by Effect” Indicate Two Different Analytical Routes Imposing Different Evidentiary Requirements on Plaintiffs, There Are No Radical Differences Between Them That Separate The Two Into One “Easy/Clear Cut/Legal Certainty” Route and Another “Difficult/Messy/Unpredictable” Route
D. The Fact That Europe Does Not Do a “Rule of Reason” Analysis Is Not an Argument Against an Analytical Approach Focusing on The Concept of Market Power
III. Identifying Steps Towards an Improved Framework for RPM Analysis Under Article 81
A. The Economics of RPM
B. The Commission’s Current & Proposed Rules Concerning RPM
C. Principles for an Improved Article 81 Analysis of RPM
D. Competition Authority Prioritization as Alternative
IV. Conclusions
Chapter 23
ASSESSING THE REASONABLENESS OF THE RULE OF REASON: THE WORLD AFTER LEEGIN
by Christine Wilson, Bimal Patel and Katrina Robson
I. Introduction
II. How Did We Get Here?
A. Dr. Miles
B. A Gradual Paradigm Shift
C. Congress Weighs In – Part One
D. A New Day Arrives – Leegin
III. Where We Are
A. Trends and Key Issues in Lower Courts and at the Agencies Post-Leegin
B. Stepping into the Shoes of Plaintiffs
IV. Where Are We Going?
A. The Spectrum of Possible Standards
B. A Rising Tide of State Opposition
C. Congress Weighs In – The Encore
D. Finding a Solution
Chapter 24
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS, RPM AND ARTICLE 81 ANALYSIS
Andreas Reindl, Presider
Ameilia Fletcher
Eric Gippini Fournier
Edurne Navarro Varona
Damien Neven
Tommy Prud’homme
Nils Wahl
Christine Wilson
Panel Discussion
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